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THE NEED FOR FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT
CLAIMS IN THE CONTEXT OF “NEW DRUGS” AND
PREMARKET-APPROVED MEDICAL DEVICES
∗

Lisa M. Mottes

I.

INTRODUCTION

Consumers have a dual expectation when it comes to drugs and
medical devices. First, consumers hope and expect for the development and distribution of helpful and life-saving drugs and medical
1
devices. Second, consumers want to be protected from the potential
2
dangers associated with such drugs and medical devices. The problem arises, however, in the fact that “the most important drugs and
3
devices . . . both . . . save lives, and . . . cost lives.” The approval
process of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for drugs and
medical devices in conjunction with federal preemption allow for
consumers’ dual expectation—the availability of life-saving products
and protection from dangers associated with these products—to be
met.
The FDA, a federal administrative agency within the Department
of Health and Human Services, is responsible for protecting and
∗

J.D. Candidate, 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2008, University of Maryland. I wish to thank Professor Jordan Paradise and Andrew Boulay for all
of their guidance throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank my family and friends for all of their support.
1
See Gerald Ford, President of the United States, Statement on Signing the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (May 28, 1976), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.
php?pid=6069 (explaining consumers’ hopes and expectations for life-saving drugs
and devices); see also Medical Device Safety Act of 2009: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 1–2 (2009) (statement of
Michael
Kinsley)
[hereinafter
Kinsley
Statement],
available
at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090512/testimony_kinsley.pdf
(testifying against the Medical Device Safety Act of 2009 because he suffers from Parkinson’s disease and has benefited from drugs and medical devices and because he is
a journalist who has written “about the damage done to our economy and country by
excessive litigation . . . over medical care”).
2
Kinsley Statement, supra note 1, at 1 (describing consumers’ desires for drugs
and medical devices).
3
Id.
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promoting public health by ensuring that drugs and medical devices
4
are safe and effective. To ensure safety and efficacy, the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) grants the FDA the authority to oversee the introduction and approval of both new drugs and
5
high-risk Class II and Class III medical devices. Before a new drug or
medical device subject to approval can be distributed to the public,
the FDA determines whether the benefits of the drug or medical de6
vice outweigh the risks associated with that drug or medical device.
As former President Gerald Ford explained,
[The FDA] daily faces a most difficult task—preventing threats to
the public health in a way that is not onerous, but fully consonant
with the principles of competitive economic development on
which this Nation was built. It is a task that requires determination, scientific skill, judgment, and most of all, compassion for the
7
hopes and needs of our fellow man.

The FDCA also gives the FDA the responsibility to promote public
health and to ensure that new drugs and medical devices are devel8
oped and distributed.
Despite the FDA’s important role, there is an ongoing dispute as
to whether the FDA’s approval of a drug or medical device should
preempt a state tort claim that challenges the safety or effectiveness
of that drug or device. Federal preemption is a legal theory that
permits federal law to override state law when that state law conflicts
with federal law; the result is that the state law is preempted and
9
“without effect.” The issue of federal preemption is relevant in the
context of new drugs and medical devices as a result of two Supreme
Court decisions. In 2008, in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Supreme
Court held that an express preemption provision in the FDCA
preempts state tort claims that challenge FDA premarket-approved

4
21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(B)–(C) (2006). The FDA is also responsible for overseeing food and cosmetic products. § 393(b)(2)(A), (D).
5
Id. § 355 (drugs); id. § 360c (devices). See discussion of approval processes infra Parts II.B, II.C.2. Drugs and Devices are found in Chapter 5 of the FDCA and include sections 501–73. These sections of the FDCA correspond to 21 U.S.C. §§ 351–
60.
6
See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 142 (2000) (“The
FDA must determine that there is a reasonable assurance that the product’s therapeutic benefits outweigh the risk of harm to the consumer.”).
7
Ford, supra note 1.
8
§ 393(b)(1). The FDA ensures that new drugs and medical devices are reviewed and marketed “promptly and efficiently.” Id.
9
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
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10

medical devices. In 2009, in Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court
held, in the absence of an express preemption provision, that FDA
approval of a new drug does not preempt state tort failure-to-warn
11
and defective-product claims. The distinct holdings in these two
cases create a disparity between new drugs and medical devices. Although new drugs and devices are both subject to FDA approval and
a finding of safety and efficacy, premarket-approved medical-device
manufacturers are immune from state tort claims and new-drug
manufacturers are not. The main reason for this disparity is the lack
of an express preemption provision for new drugs within the FDCA.
As a result of the discord of Riegel and Wyeth, a call for safety and
efficacy has been initiated, and Congress has indicated that change is
12
necessary. Select members of Congress have expressed their view
that the advantages of the state tort system and the dangers associated
with drugs and devices indicate that there should be a uniform standard of no preemption for both new drugs and premarket-approved
13
devices.
The late Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative
Frank Pallone introduced bills into both the Senate and House of
Representatives in 2008 and 2009 that would effectually overturn the
Riegel decision, amend the FDCA, and remove the express preemp14
tion provision for premarket-approved medical devices. Enactment
of either iteration would resolve the current disparity, and neither
premarket-approved medical-device manufacturers nor new-drug
manufacturers would be able to argue federal preemption as a defense to state law products liability claims.
This proposed legislation, the Medical Device Safety Act
(“MDSA”), has initiated a debate as to whether the current preemption provided in § 360k is beneficial or detrimental in the context of
10

See 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008); see also id. at 333 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating the majority’s holding). The express preemption provision is in § 360k of the
FDCA.
11
See 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1204 (2009). A failure-to-warn claim alleges that the seller
of the product is liable for harm that is caused as the result of failing to provide a
warning where a reasonable person would have included a warning. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 10(a) (1998). A reasonable person would
provide a warning if the product “poses a substantial risk of harm.” Id. § 10(b)(1).
Defective-product claims allege that the seller of a defective product is liable for
harms caused as a result of the defect. Id. § 1.
12
See Medical Device Safety Act of 2009, S. 540, 111th Cong. (2009); Medical Device Safety Act of 2009, H.R. 1346, 111th Cong. (2009); Medical Device Safety Act of
2008, S. 3398, 110th Cong. (2008); Medical Device Safety Act of 2008, H.R. 6381,
110th Cong. (2008).
13
S. 540; H.R. 1346; S. 3398; H.R. 6381.
14
S. 540; H.R. 1346; S. 3398; H.R. 6381.
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15

medical devices. This debate raised by the proposed legislation also
exposes the same arguments for federal preemption in the context of
16
new drugs. Opponents of federal preemption argue that preemption denies injured patients the opportunity to bring state tort claims
17
that provide a means of compensation and relief. Proponents of
preemption argue that preemption is necessary to promote innovation and the development of risky yet beneficial drugs and devices
because without preemption, manufacturers will be reluctant to pro18
duce drugs or devices if subject to state tort claims.
This Comment will argue that the FDCA should be amended to
include an express preemption provision for new drugs so that newdrug manufacturers and premarket-approved device manufactures
will be treated uniformly. The FDA’s approval process serves as support for this recommended action because it ensures the safety and
efficacy of new drugs and premarket-approved medical devices.
Preemption helps promote innovation and development by encouraging manufacturers to develop new products and keep products on
the market. Finally, the approval process for new drugs is even more
rigorous than the rigorous premarket-approval process for medical
devices. Therefore, preemption should continue to be recognized
for premarket-approved devices and should be extended to new
drugs.
Part II of this Comment will analyze the legislative history of the
FDA, the approval process of new drugs under § 505 of the FDCA,
and the approval process of medical devices under § 513 of the
FDCA. Part III will discuss preemption generally, will summarize
Medtronic v. Lohr, Riegel, and Wyeth, which are the Supreme Court
cases addressing preemption for medical devices and new drugs, will
indicate the effect of these cases, and will explain the disparity that
has resulted. Part IV will argue for federal preemption after weighing
15

21 U.S.C. § 360k (2006); S. 540; H.R. 1346.
See, e.g., Press Release, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Health Leaders Introduce Legislation Reversing Supreme Court’s Medical Device Decision (Mar. 5,
2009) [hereinafter Committee on Energy and Commerce], available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=
1518 (describing the positive outcomes of the decision against federal preemption in
Wyeth and describing how the same benefits would result from passage of the MDSA);
see also The Medical Device Safety Act of 2009: Hearing on S. 540, Before the Comm. on
Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 10 (2009) (statement of Peter Barton
Hutt, former chief counsel of FDA) [hereinafter Hutt Statement], available at
http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/hutt.pdf (describing the advantages of federal preemption).
17
See infra Part IV.A.2.
18
See infra Part IV.B.
16
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the advantages and disadvantages of preemption and concluding that
FDA approval is a sufficient substitute for state tort claims. Part V will
suggest a remedy for the disparity between medical devices and new
drugs and will set forth the steps Congress should take to preserve the
express preemption of medical devices and create an express
preemption provision for new drugs.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FDA & AN OVERVIEW OF FDA
APPROVAL OF NEW DRUGS AND MEDICAL DEVICES
Congress and the FDA have indicated that the FDA has two
principal responsibilities: to protect public health and to promote
19
public health. In the last century, the FDA has been an important
mechanism in protecting public health by assuring that drugs, medical devices, and other medical products and foods are safe, effective,
20
and secure. The FDA has also been an important mechanism of
promoting public health by allowing for the development and approval of new technology and innovations that “make medicines and
21
foods more effective, safer, and more affordable.”
A. History of the FDA’s Legislative Provisions
The first significant step towards safety and efficacy occurred in
1906 when Congress enacted the Federal Food and Drug Act that
prevented adulterated or misbranded foods, drugs, medicines, and
22
liquors from being manufactured, sold, or transported. Because this
act only reached adulteration and misbranding, further regulation
soon became necessary, and on June 25, 1938, President Franklin De-

19

21 U.S.C. § 393 (2006).
The [FDA] shall promote the public health by promptly and efficiently
reviewing clinical research and taking appropriate action on the marketing of regulated products in a timely manner; . . . [The FDA shall]
protect the public health by ensuring that . . . drugs are safe and effective . . . [and] there is [a] reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of devices intended for human use[.]
§ 393(b)(1), (2)(B)–(C).
20
See
What
We
Do,
U.S.
FOOD
AND
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/default.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2010)
[hereinafter What We Do] (describing the FDA’s mission); see also Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (explaining the government’s role in protecting “the
health of our people”).
21
What We Do, supra note 20.
22
Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, 59 Pub. L. No. 384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006)). Adulterated products are poisonous, unsanitary, and overall unsafe. § 351(a). Misbranded products contain misleading advertising or labeling. Id. § 321(n).

MOTTES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/12/2011 9:31 AM

728

[Vol. 41:723

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

lano Roosevelt signed the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
23
(“FDCA”). A significant effect of the FDCA was that the FDA’s regulatory authority expanded to include medical devices and cosmetics.
24
The Act also gave the FDA the authority to regulate adulterated or
misbranded medical devices and required all “new drug” manufacturers to submit a premarket notification, which included safety as25
surances, to the FDA. Section 201 of the FDCA defines a “new drug”
as follows:
Any drug . . . the composition of which is such that such drug is
not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific
training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of
drugs, as safe and effective for use under the conditions pre26
scribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof[.]

In 1962, the Kefauver Drug Amendments were enacted “to streng27
then the new drug regulatory system.” The amendments required
new drugs to undergo premarket approval instead of premarket notification and required that new drugs be found to be both safe and ef28
fective before being approved.
Although devices were subject to federal regulatory control as to
29
30
adulteration and misbranding, devices were not subject to a pre-

23
FDA History, Part II: The 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/
ucm054826.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
24
Id. Devices were covered because at this time drugs were defined to include
medical devices. Peter Barton Hutt, A History of Government Regulation of Adulteration
and Misbranding of Medical Devices, 44 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 99, 102 (1989).
25
Hutt, supra note 24, at 104. At this time, the FDA only had regulatory authority
to control the adulteration and misbranding of medical devices. Id.
26
21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2006). The FDCA defines a “drug” as:
[A]rticles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, official Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; and . . . articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease in man or other animals; and . . . articles (other
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body
of man or other animals . . . .
§ 321(g)(1)(A)–(C).
27
Hutt, supra note 24, at 106.
28
Id. A companion bill that would have required a similar premarket approval
method for medical devices was also considered but was never passed. Id. See Part
II.C.2 infra for a description of the premarket notification and premarket approval
processes.
29
A drug or device is considered adulterated when it contains poisonous or unsanitary components or if it was manufactured, processed, packaged, etc., under unsanitary conditions. 21 U.S.C. § 351(a).

MOTTES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

4/12/2011 9:31 AM

COMMENT

729

31

market-review process like new drugs. Medical technology was progressively advancing and new, more complex and potentially danger32
ous devices were being developed. The FDCA was in need of an
33
amendment to expand its regulatory authority over medical devices.
This need was especially evidenced by the fact that there were conflicting state regulations for medical devices, and many states had
34
created their own premarket regulations for medical devices.
In response, President Richard Nixon instructed the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) to establish a study
35
group. Dr. Theodore Cooper chaired this group, the Study Group
36
on Medical Devices (“Cooper Committee”). In September 1970, the
Cooper Committee issued its report and concluded that medical devices required a distinctive regulatory approach and that medical devices should be classified and subject to different approval methods
37
based on the classification assigned to the device. The recommendations of the Cooper Committee became the basis for the Medical
38
Device Amendments of 1976 (“MDA”). The MDA categorizes medical devices into classes based on their level of perceived risk: some
devices undergo premarket notification, some undergo premarket
39
approval, and some undergo neither.
B. FDA Approval of New Drugs
Every year, the FDA approves approximately one-hundred new
40
drugs. Section 505 of the FDCA regulates the approval of new drugs

30

A drug or device is considered misbranded when it is in any way false or misleading. Id. § 352(a).
31
Hutt, supra note 24, at 117.
32
Ford, supra note 1.
33
See SHARON FRANK, A NEW MODEL FOR EUROPEAN MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION
152 (2003).
34
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 333 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
For example, California had its own premarket approval (“PMA”) process for medical devices. Id.
35
FRANK, supra note 33, at 154.
36
Id.
37
Hutt, supra note 24, at 109–10.
38
FRANK, supra note 33, at 154.
39
21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006).
40
See Lawrence O. Gostin, Regulating the Safety of Pharmaceuticals: The FDA, Preemption, and the Public’s Health, 301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2036, 2036 (2009) (describing the
number of drugs approved each year); Drug Approval Reports, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMIN.:
CENTER
FOR
DRUG
EVALUATION
AND
RESEARCH,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/Scripts/cder/DrugsatFDA/index.cfm?fuseaction=Re
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and requires new-drug sponsors to file a New Drug Application
41
(“NDA”) before the drug can be introduced into the market. Before filing the NDA, non-clinical and clinical testing must be conducted by the sponsor to “demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of
42
the [new] drug.” Prior to conducting clinical tests, however, the
43
sponsor must file an Investigational New Drug Application (“IND”),
which allows the new drug to be lawfully shipped across state lines
44
and undergo clinical testing in various states.
Once the IND is approved and clinical testing is complete, the
drug’s sponsor can file a NDA with the FDA. The NDA must include,
among other things, all of the following: investigation reports that
indicate whether or not the drug is safe and effective in its use; a list
of the drug’s components; a statement of the drug’s composition; a
description of how the drug is manufactured, processed, and pack45
aged; samples of the drug; and a proposed label. The NDA enables
the FDA to review whether the drug is safe—that is, whether its benefits outweigh its risks—and whether “substantial evidence” exists to
demonstrate that the drug is effective, as based on adequate and well46
controlled studies. This “substantial evidence” standard for effectiveness is defined as follows:
[E]vidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by
scientific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of
the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the

ports.ReportsMenu (last visited Sept. 1, 2010) (reporting the drug applications that
are approved each month).
41
§ 355(a).
42
PETER BARTON HUTT, The Regulation of Drug Products by the United States Food and
Drug Administration, in TEXTBOOK OF PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE (John P. Griffin &
John O’Grady, eds. 2006), reprinted in PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL &
LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 676 (3rd ed. 2007).
43
21 C.F.R. § 312.20(b) (2010).
44
§ 312.1(a). The IND includes, among other things, the investigational plan,
which may include the rationale for the study, what will be studied, the types of clinical trials to be done, and the approach used to evaluate the drug. § 312.23(a)(3)(iv).
45
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A)–(F) (2006). The sponsor must also provide the patent number and patent expiration date. Id.
46
See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2010) (“Reports of adequate and well-controlled investigations provide the primary basis for determining whether there is ‘substantial evidence’ to support the claims of effectiveness for new drugs.”). Only one adequate
and well-controlled study is needed to provide substantial evidence of effectiveness.
21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006).
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effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions
47
of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the [label].

The NDA also allows the FDA to determine whether the drug is safe
for use as the proposed label prescribes, recommends, and suggests
and allows the FDA to determine whether the “methods used in
manufacturing the drug and the controls used to maintain the drug’s
quality are adequate to preserve the drug’s identity, strength, and
48
purity,” (i.e., that there are current good manufacturing practices
49
(“CGMP”)). If the NDA demonstrates that the new drug is safe and
50
effective, the application will be approved.
Conversely, if the application in some way demonstrates that the
new drug will be unsafe or ineffective, the FDA will not approve the
application. If a new drug application demonstrates that the drug is
unsafe “under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed label,” the FDA will not approve the applica51
tion. If “there is a lack of substantial evidence that the drug will
have the effect” it is said to have under the “conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed [label],” the
FDA will not approve the application because the drug is deemed in52
effective. Finally, if the proposed label is false or misleading, the
53
FDA will not approve the application.
C. FDA Approval of Medical Devices
The approval process for medical devices is found within the
FDCA and was enacted as part of the Medical Device Amendments
(“MDA”). As the preamble to the MDA states, the MDA was enacted
to ensure that medical devices are safe and effective by providing a
process for premarket approval based in part on the drug approval

47

§ 355(d).
§ 355(b); see also New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopeda
ndApproved/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/default.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2010) (describing the requirements of the NDA).
49
See 21 C.F.R. 210.1(a) (2010) (describing the CGMP used to ensure drugs meet
the requirements for “manufactur[ing], processing, packing, or holding” that assure
the drug’s safety).
50
§ 355(d).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
48
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54

process. The legislation achieves this purpose by classifying medical
devices into three different classes based on their risk and by requiring the approval decision be based on whether there is “reasonable
55
assurance” that the device is safe and effective. As the regulations
explain,
There is reasonable assurance that a device is safe when it can be
determined, based upon valid scientific evidence, that the probable benefits to health from use of the device for its intended uses
and conditions of use, when accompanied by adequate directions
and warnings against unsafe use, outweigh any probable risks.
The valid scientific evidence used to determine the safety of a device shall adequately demonstrate the absence of unreasonable
risk of illness or injury associated with the use of the device for its
56
intended uses and conditions of use.

Thus, the “reasonable assurances” standard for medical devices is similar to the standard of safety for drugs, as both define safety to mean
57
that the benefits outweigh the risks.
1.

Classes of Medical Devices

Class I medical devices pose the least risk and include devices
that are not used to support or sustain life and “do not present a po58
tential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.” Class I medical devices are only subject to “general controls” contained within various statutory provisions of the FDCA and FDA regulations promulgated
59
under the authority set out in the FDCA. The provisions include
adulteration in § 501 of the FDCA, misbranding in § 502, registration
in § 510, banned devices in § 516, notification and other remedies in
§ 518, records and reports in § 510, and other general provisions in §
60
520. These statutory provisions are used to provide “reasonable assurance” that the device is safe and effective and thus that the prod61
ucts are not adulterated, misbranded, or banned. Unless exempt,

54

See Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539
(1976) (“An act to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to provide for
the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use.”).
55
§ 360c.
56
21 C.F.R. § 860.7(d)(1) (2010).
57
See discussion supra Part II.B.
58
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii)(I)–(II).
59
21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1) (2010).
60
Id.
61
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(i). “General controls are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device.” 21 C.F.R. §
860.3(c)(1).
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Class I medical devices are also subject to the 510(k)-approval
62
process.
Class II medical devices are devices that require more than general controls to provide “reasonable assurance” that the device is safe
and effective and instead require special controls in addition to the
63
general controls. Special controls include:
promulgation of performance standards, postmarket surveillance,
patient registries, development and dissemination of guidance
documents (including guidance on the submission of clinical data
in premarket notification in accordance with section 510(k) of
64
the act), recommendations, and other appropriate actions.

Similar to Class I devices, unless exempt, Class II medical devices are
65
also subject to the 510(k)-approval process.
When a device is considered high-risk or insufficient information exists to prove safety and effectiveness based only on general or
66
special controls, the device is classified as Class III. Class III medical
devices are devices “purported or represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial
importance in preventing impairment of human health, or [ . . . ]
67
presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury[.]” Class
III medical devices represent the riskiest devices, and because they
require more than general or special controls to provide a “reasonable assurance” of safety and efficacy, some Class III medical devices
68
are subject to premarket approval (“PMA”).
2.

PMA & Its Exceptions

Similar to the new-drug-approval process, PMA-medical devices
undergo clinical investigations to determine safety and effectiveness;
as with the IND application for new drugs, PMA-medical devices must

62

See § 360c(f)(1); discussion infra Part II.C.2.
§ 360c(a)(1)(B).
64
21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(2).
65
See § 360c(f)(1); discussion infra Part II.C.2.
66
§ 860.3(c)(3).
67
§ 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)–(II).
68
§ 360c(a)(1)(C). Some Class II medical devices also undergo PMA. The FDA
regulations do not require all Class III medical devices to be approved by PMA, and
from 2003 to 2007, most Class III medical devices were approved through the 510(k)
process. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-190, MEDICAL DEVICES: FDA
SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE HIGH-RISK DEVICE TYPES ARE APPROVED THROUGH THE
MOST STRINGENT PREMARKET REVIEW PROCESS 16 (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09190.pdf; see infra notes 75–78 and accompanying
text.
63
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get an Investigation-Device Exemption (“IDE”) approved to allow for
lawful shipping of the device across state lines and clinical testing in
69
various states. Once clinical testing is complete, the PMA process
requires a device sponsor to submit an application that contains,
among other things, the investigational reports from the clinical tests
that demonstrate “whether or not [the] device is safe and effective”; a
statement of the “components, ingredients, and properties, and of
the [principle(s)] of operation” of the device; a description of the
device’s manufacture, processing, packaging, and installation; sam70
ples of the device; and a proposed label.
The FDA determines
whether a PMA device is safe and effective based on the target individuals who will use the device and the “conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested” in the label, as well as by comparing the
71
benefits of the device with the risk of any injury or illness. Regulators will deny a PMA application if, among other reasons, the information in the application demonstrates a “lack of showing of reasonable assurance that such device is safe,” “a lack of showing of
reasonable assurance that the device is effective,” or that the pro72
posed label is “false or misleading.”
Most Class III medical devices are not subject to PMA. Through
a “grandfather clause,” Class III medical devices that were introduced
into the market before Congress enacted the MDA and Class III medical devices that are “substantially equivalent” to another already73
approved predicate device do not require PMA. A device is “substantially equivalent” if it “has the same intended use . . . and has the
same technological characteristics as the predicate device or . . . has
different technological characteristics” but the information showing
that the device is substantially equivalent “demonstrates that the device is as safe and effective as a legally marketed device and . . . does

69

21 C.F.R. § 812.1(a) (2010); see also Device Advice: Investigational Device Exemption
(IDE),
U.S.
FOOD
AND
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketY
ourDevice/InvestigationalDeviceExemptionIDE/default.htm (last visited Sept. 1,
2010) (describing the IDE process and requirements). IDEs are also used for clinical
testing for devices approved by the 510(k) premarket-notification process. Id. While
testing is being conducted, a PMA or 510(k) premarket notification does not need to
be submitted. Id.
70
21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(A)–(C), (E)–(F).
71
Id. § 360c(a)(2)(A)–(C).
72
Id. § 360e(d)(2)(A)–(B), (D).
73
§ 360e(b)(1)(A)–(B).
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not raise different questions of safety and effectiveness than the pre74
dicate device.”
Instead of PMA, substantially equivalent devices, new Class I devices, new Class II devices, and some Class III devices are subject to
the 510(k)-approval process, which requires the submission of pre75
market notification (“PMN”) to the FDA. The PMN must include,
among other things, the name and class of the device, a 510(k) summary that shows the basis for determining substantial equivalence,
76
and the proposed label. Moreover, for devices claiming to be substantially equivalent to a predicate-Class III device, the PMN must also
include “a summary of the types of safety and effectiveness problems
77
associated with the type of devices being compared.”
Compared with PMA, obtaining FDA approval of a medical device through the 510(k) process is much easier and faster because essentially all that is needed for 510(k) approval is a demonstration of
“substantial equivalence,” as “safety and effectiveness data are not ex78
plicitly required.” For 510(k) clearance, a medical-device manufacturer only needs to give the FDA ninety days’ notice of its intent to
79
market a device, and the standard fee for review is approximately
80
$4,000. Conversely, the FDA approves or denies PMA-device appli-

74

Id. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).
Premarket
Notification
(510k),
U.S.
FOOD
AND
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/howtomarketyou
rdevice/premarketsubmissions/premarketnotification510k/default.htm#se (last visited Nov. 1, 2010); see also 21 C.F.R. § 807.81 (2010). As long as it is not exempt, a
Class I or Class II medical device will be subject to the 510(k) process. 21 U.S.C.
360c(f)(1). The exempt devices include, among other things, anesthesiology devices, cardiovascular devices, dental devices, neurological devices, and orthopedic devices. 21 C.F.R. §§ 862–92 (2010).
76
21 C.F.R. § 807.92.
77
Id.
78
See Jonathan S. Kahan, Premarket Approval Versus Premarket Notification: Different
Routes to the Same Market, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 510, 515–16 (1984) (comparing
the PMA and 510(k) processes). For example, in December 2009, the 510(k)
process approved more than 200 devices; however, no devices received PMA original
approval. See December 2009 510(k) Clearances, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/DeviceApprov
alsandClearances/510kClearances/ucm196259.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2010); December
2009
PMA
Approvals,
U.S.
FOOD
AND
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/Device
ApprovalsandClearances/PMAApprovals/ucm198613.htm (last visited May 20,
2010).
79
21 U.S.C. § 360(k).
80
Premarket Notification [510(k)] Review Fees, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketY
75
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81

cations after 180 days, and the standard fee for review of a PMA ap82
plication is approximately $240,000.
Furthermore, the 510(k)
process is currently under review by the Institute of Medicine to determine whether it “sufficiently protects patients and promotes public
83
health.”
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S VIEW ON FDA APPROVAL AND PREEMPTION
A. Preemption Generally
Defendants use preemption as a defense to argue that federal
law conflicts with, and thus supersedes, the state law that is the basis
84
for the plaintiff’s claim. In state tort suits in which defendants argue
preemption, the plaintiff is usually putting forth a common-law claim
of strict liability or negligence and is seeking compensation for injury
85
or other harm. When a court finds a state law preempted, the defendant essentially receives immunity from the state tort claims and
86
the plaintiff is left without compensation for his injury or harm.
The source of federal preemption is the Supremacy Clause in
Article VI of the Constitution, which states that federal law “shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or
87
Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” The Supreme
Court clarified this constitutional provision by explaining that “state

ourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketNotification510k/ucm134566.htm
(last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
81
21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(1)(A).
82
PMA
Review
Fees,
U.S.
FOOD
AND
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketY
ourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketApprovalPMA/ucm048161.htm#fees
(last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
83
Public Health Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, http://www.iom.edu/Activities/PublicHealth/510KProcess.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
84
See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1192 (2009) (describing Wyeth’s preemption defense). Preemption is defined as “the principle that a federal law can supersede or supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1197 (7th ed. 1999).
85
See, e.g., Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1191–92 (describing Ms. Levine’s common law
claims of strict liability and negligence and the initiation of her lawsuit to seek damages); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 320–21 (2008) (describing the Riegels’
common law claims of strict liability and negligence); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 481 (1996) (describing the Lohrs’ state common law claims of strict liability
and negligence).
86
See infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. But see infra note 99 and accompanying text.
87
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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law that conflicts with federal law is ‘without effect.’” When analyzing preemption, the Supreme Court explained that there is an “assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be
superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest
89
purpose of Congress.” This “clear and manifest purpose” is present
when Congress has indicated through either express, implied, or conflict preemption that federal law will regulate a specific area, and, as a
90
result, any state law covering that area will be preempted.
Express preemption occurs when Congress’s indication for
91
preemption is “explicitly stated” in a statute. In Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, the Supreme Court analyzed two statutes with expressly
preemptive language: the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
92
Act of 1965 and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969.
The court found that these two federal statutes regulating cigarettes
93
expressly preempted some of the petitioner’s state tort claims, and
the defendant was thus immune from liability stemming from these
94
claims.
Implied preemption occurs when preemption is implied in the
95
statute’s “structure and purpose.”
More specifically, implied
preemption occurs, in the absence of an express provision, “if federal
law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field ‘as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement
96
it.’” The Supreme Court analyzed implied preemption in Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp, holding that a federal law on nuclear safety did not

88
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
89
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (internal citations
omitted).
90
See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525–26 (1977).
91
Id. at 525.
92
505 U.S. 504, 514–15 (1992).
93
Id. at 530–31.
The 1965 Act did not pre-empt state law damages actions; the 1969 Act
pre-empts petitioner’s claims based on a failure to warn and the neutralization of federally mandated warnings to the extent that those
claims rely on omissions or inclusions in respondents’ advertising or
promotions; the 1969 Act does not pre-empt petitioner’s claims based
on express warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy.
Id.
94
Id. at 504.
95
Id. at 516 (quoting Jones, 430 U.S. at 525).
96
Id. (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982)).
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preempt a state’s award of punitive damages to an individual harmed
by plutonium that had leaked from a nuclear facility where the indi97
vidual worked.
Despite a previous Supreme Court holding that
98
Congress “occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns,” the
Court in Silkwood found no preemption; thus, the defendant was not
immune from liability, and the injured party was entitled to compen99
sation.
Finally, in the absence of an express provision and even when
Congress has not entirely occupied the field, conflict preemption oc100
curs if the state law “conflicts with federal law.” The Supreme Court
101
has identified two situations in which conflict preemption arises:
when a manufacturer could not possibly follow both the federal and
102
state regulations or when “‘[state] law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
103
Congress.’”
B. Preemption in the Context of Medical Devices and Drugs
As of 2009, the Supreme Court has held that PMA-medical de104
vices are subject to preemption but that new drugs are not. One of
the main reasons for this distinction is that the MDA includes an express preemption provision for medical devices that are subject to re105
view for safety and efficacy. The express preemption provision, in §
521 of the FDCA, states that
no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use
any requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition to,
any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to
any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the de106
vice under this Act [21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.].
97

464 U.S. 238, 241, 249 (1984).
See id. (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983)).
99
Id. at 258.
100
Id. at 248. Wyeth argued conflict preemption as a defense in Wyeth v. Levine.
See infra notes 140–42 and accompanying text.
101
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1208 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
102
Id. (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–
43 (1963)).
103
Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
104
See infra Parts III.B.2–3.
105
See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
106
Medical Device Amendments of 1976 § 521, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1)–(2).
98
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One of the main reasons that the MDA express preemption provision
was added to the FDCA was that there were conflicting state regulations for medical devices, and many states had created their own reg107
ulations for approval.
The 1962 amendments did not require devices to be subject to a premarket-review process for safety and
108
efficacy, and because the FDA did not regulate safety and efficacy,
the states did. Therefore, a purpose of the express preemption provision was to coordinate device approval.
1.

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr

One of the first cases to interpret the MDA express preemption
109
provision was Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr. The case involved a pacemaker
that was a Class III substantially equivalent medical device that had
110
obtained approval in the 510(k) process. In Medtronic, the Supreme
Court found that the 510(k)-approval process, which requires premarket notification and a finding of substantial equivalence, only
provides minimal protection and, consequently, does not preempt
111
state tort claims. In other words, the 510(k) process does not focus
on safety or effectiveness but only focuses on equivalence; therefore,
the Court explained that a finding of substantial equivalence “‘pro112
vide[s] little protection to the public.’”
The Court found that the MDA preempts state requirements
that are specifically developed “with respect to” medical devices and
are different from or additional to an FDA requirement specific to
the device; the state requirements at issue and the minimal protections of 510(k) were only general requirements and were not specific
113
to the device at issue.
Thus, the express preemption provision in
the MDA did not preempt the plaintiff’s state tort claims against
Medtronic. Because the 510(k) process approved the device in Medtronic, the Supreme Court only analyzed the MDA’s preemption pro-

107
See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 333 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing regulations of states, including California, which had its own PMA
process for medical devices).
108
Hutt, supra note 24, at 106.
109
518 U.S. 470 (1996).
110
See id. at 477.
111
See id. at 493–94 (explaining that the § 510(k) process “did not ‘require’ Medtronics’ pacemaker to take any particular form for any particular reason”).
112
Id. at 493 (quoting Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in
the Right Direction Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 511,
516 (1988)).
113
Id. at 501.
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114

vision in the context of that process.
The Court did not consider
the express preemption provision in the context of the PMA process
until Riegel.
2.

Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.

Twelve years later, the Supreme Court again interpreted the express preemption provision in the MDA in a case that involved a Class
115
III catheter that had received PMA. The plaintiff, Mr. Riegel, had a
Medtronic Evergreen Balloon Catheter inserted into his coronary ar116
tery. During the surgery, his doctor inflated the catheter to a level
117
beyond the maximum indicated on the label. Mr. Riegel’s coronary
artery was both diffusely diseased and heavily calcified, two conditions
that the device’s label warned were symptoms for which use of the ca118
theter was contraindicated. As a result, the catheter ruptured, and
Mr. Riegel was forced to undergo emergency coronary-bypass sur119
gery. Although the doctor’s negligence played a significant role in
Mr. Riegel’s injuries, Mr. Riegel also initiated a lawsuit against Medtronic in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
120
New York.
Mr. Riegel alleged that the catheter was “designed, labeled, and manufactured in a manner that violated New York com121
mon law.”
The Supreme Court held that the MDA in § 360k preempts
“common-law claims challenging the safety and effectiveness” of de122
vices that received PMA. Accordingly, the express preemption provision acts as a defense for the manufacturers of Class III PMA devices
from conflicting state-law claims and provides immunity to these
manufacturers based on the fact that they complied with and were

114

Id.
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 320 (2008). Unlike the pacemaker in
Medtronic, which was approved through the grandfather clause because it was substantially equivalent, the catheter in Riegel was approved through PMA. See supra note
110 and accompanying text. As of 1996, when the Court decided Medtronic, “the FDA
[had] not yet initiated nor suggested the initiation of a PMA process for pacemakers
or most other grandfathered devices.” Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 478 n.3.
116
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 320.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id. Mr. Riegel’s common law claims were negligence, breach of warranty, and
strict liability. Id.
121
Id.
122
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 315.
115
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123

approved by the FDA’s PMA. Unlike Medtronic, the Supreme Court
held that PMA is a specific requirement relating to safety and efficacy
124
and thus has a preemptive effect.
Therefore, after Medtronic and
Riegel, the 510(k) process, which focuses on equivalence and not safety, does not have a preemptive effect, but the PMA process, which fo125
cuses on safety and not equivalence, does have a preemptive effect.
The Court emphasized that the MDA-preemption provision only
preempts state requirements that are “different from, or in addition
126
to” federal requirements.
The Court explained that federal law
does not preempt state requirements that parallel FDA requirements,
such as those that provide damages for a manufacturer’s violation of
127
FDA regulations.
Riegel’s holding in favor of preemption only applies to the limited number of Class III medical devices that have met
128
PMA. Therefore, the preemption provision does not apply to Class
I devices, Class II devices, or Class III devices that are found to be
substantially equivalent and approved under the § 510(k)-approval
129
process.
3.

Wyeth v. Levine

A year later, in Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court addressed
whether the FDA’s drug-labeling requirements and approval preempt
state tort claims regarding the adequacy of the label, and more specif130
ically, failure-to-warn claims.
The Court held that the FDA’s approval of the drug, which in effect approves the label that the sponsor
131
provides as part of the NDA, does not preempt a state tort claim.
Because no express preemption provision relating to drugs exists, the
132
Court analyzed whether implied preemption applied.
The case involved the Wyeth-manufactured drug Phenergan,
which the FDA initially approved in 1955, and which is used to treat
nausea and can be administered intravenously through either an “IV-

123

See id.; see also id. at 333 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating the majority’s hold-

ing).
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

Id. at 322–23 (majority opinion).
Id. at 323.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1) (2006); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 328.
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 329–30.
Id.
See supra Part II.A.
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1193 (2009).
Id. at 1191.
Id. at 1199–1200.

MOTTES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/12/2011 9:31 AM

742

[Vol. 41:723

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
133

push” or “IV-drip” method. Diana Levine was suffering from a migraine headache and nausea, and she initially received an intramus134
cular injection of Phenergan.
The first injection did not ease her
suffering, and although Phenergan’s label warned that extreme care
should be used to avoid the IV-push method because gangrene and
135
amputation could result, Ms. Levine was given another injection of
136
The second IV-push inPhenergan through the IV-push method.
jection caused Phenergan to enter her artery; as a result, Ms. Levine
developed gangrene, and consequently, her entire right forearm was
137
amputated.
Ms. Levine sued Wyeth based on a failure-to-warn claim arguing
that Phenergan’s label was defective because it did not specifically
give instructions to use the IV-drip method as opposed to the IV-push
138
method.
Ms. Levine also argued that the IV-push method was un139
safe as its risks far outweighed its benefits. Wyeth argued that both
types of conflict preemption preempted Ms. Levine’s claim, i.e., that
it was impossible to follow the state’s label requirements “without violating federal law” and that Ms. Levine’s state tort action was an
“‘obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress because it substitutes a lay jury’s decision
140
about drug labeling for the expert judgment of the FDA.”
In response to Wyeth’s first argument, the Court held that
Wyeth could have complied with the state requirements of adding a
141
stronger label without violating federal law.
To the second argu133
Id. at 1191. The “IV-push” method injects the drug “directly into a patient’s
vein.” Id. The “IV-drip” method first injects the drug into a hanging intravenous bag
containing saline solution, and then the drug is injected from the bag and through a
catheter into the patient’s vein. Id.
134
Id. Specifically, the Phenergan was administered to treat her nausea, and Ms.
Levine received Demerol to treat her headache. Id.
135
Id. at 1191 & n.1.
136
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1191.
137
Id. Phenergan entered her artery either because intra-arterial injection occurred, where the needle entered the artery, or because perivascular extravasation
occurred, where Phenergan entered the tissue surrounding her veins. Id.
138
Id. at 1191–92. Ms. Levine’s claims were based on common-law strict liability
and negligence. Id. at 1191.
139
Id. at 1192.
140
Id. at 1193–94 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). As to the first argument, the state requirements would have required Wyeth to modify the label and warn of the IV-push method’s hazards. Id. at
1193. The federal law, the “changes being effected” regulation, would have allowed
Wyeth to strengthen its warning without receiving FDA approvals through a supplemental application. Id. at 1196–97; 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) (2010).
141
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198.
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ment, the Court concluded “from silence that Congress believed state
142
lawsuits pose no obstacle to federal drug-approval objectives.”
Thus, the Court held that no implied preemption applied to Ms. Levine’s state tort claim.
In reaching its decision, the Court also considered the FDA’s position on preemption at the time of the case. In 2006, in the preamble to a drug-label regulation, the FDA voiced its position in favor of
preemption by indicating that its approval is preemptive; the FDA
stated that “FDA approval of labeling . . . preempts conflicting or contrary State law” and that the FDA’s approval is now both a floor and a
143
ceiling.
The Court ultimately decided that the FDA’s position was
inherently suspect and that no deference should be given to this new
position because the FDA had changed its position without giving an144
yone notice or an opportunity to comment.
C. Effects of Riegel and Wyeth
1.

Lack of Uniformity Between Medical Devices and New
Drugs

As a result of the Riegel and Wyeth decisions, there is a lack of uniformity as to preemption. The manufacturers of premarketapproved Class III medical devices can utilize the express preemption
provision as a defense and are immune from state tort liability, but
the manufacturers of new drugs cannot take advantage of any
preemption defense and will still be subject to state tort liability. Interestingly, both cases analyzed the FDA’s approval process in decid145
ing the issue of preemption but came to conflicting conclusions.
The Riegel decision indicated that the FDA’s approval process is sufficient to shield the PMA-medical-device manufacturer from liability,
but the Wyeth decision seemed to suggest that the state tort system is
146
still needed to supplement the FDA’s new-drug-approval process.
These conflicting Supreme Court decisions raise questions as to
whether FDA approval is sufficient to protect and make whole a
plaintiff without state tort actions and whether courts should contin-

142

See id. at 1216 (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the majority’s holding).
Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934–35 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, and 601) [hereinafter Requirements I]. See infra
notes 163–68 and accompanying text.
144
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201; see infra notes 163–68 and accompanying text.
145
See supra Parts III.B.2–3.
146
See id.
143
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ue to treat PMA-medical devices and new drugs differently with regard to federal preemption. These issues will be analyzed in Parts IV
and V.
2.

Why the Issues of Preemption, FDA Approval, State
Tort Actions, and Uniformity are Important Now

The preemption and uniformity issues surrounding PMA medical devices and new drugs are especially relevant now. As a result of
Riegel and Wyeth, a call for safety and efficacy has been initiated, and
147
Congress has indicated that change is necessary. In both 2008, following Riegel, and 2009, following Wyeth, legislation was introduced
that would effectively overrule Riegel and amend the MDA to remove
148
preemption for Class III medical devices. Select members of Congress indicated their view that the protections of the state tort system
and a uniform standard of no preemption for both new drugs and
149
PMA devices are superior to allowing preemption.
On March 5, 2009, the day following the decision in Wyeth, the
Medical Device Safety Act of 2009 (“MDSA”) was introduced into
150
both the House of Representatives and the Senate.
The MDSA
would amend § 521 of the FDCA, which is the MDA express preemption provision relating to PMA medical devices, by adding the following: “nothing in this section shall be construed to modify or otherwise
affect any action for damages or the liability of any person under the
151
law of any State.” The MDSA would prevent device manufacturers
from using the express preemption provision as a defense to argue
that the MDA preempts state tort claims even if their Class III device
147

See Medical Device Safety Act of 2009, S. 540, 111th Cong. (2009); Medical Device Safety Act of 2009, H.R. 1346, 111th Cong. (2009); Medical Device Safety Act of
2008, S. 3398, 110th Cong. (2008); Medical Device Safety Act of 2008, H.R. 6381,
110th Cong. (2008). When introducing the Medical Device Safety Act into the
House of Representatives, Frank Pallone of New Jersey stated:
[T]he Supreme Court rightfully upheld a patient’s right to legal recourse after sustaining an injury from a pharmaceutical product. Today, we introduce legislation that gives patients that same right when
injured by a medical device. This legislation puts safety first and eliminates the blanket immunity that medical device companies currently
enjoy thanks to an unfortunate Supreme Court decision last year.
Committee on Energy and Commerce, supra note 16.
148
See S. 540; H.R. 1346; S. 3398; H.R. 6381. The legislation has not been passed
as of the date of publication.
149
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
150
S. 540; H.R. 1346. The sponsor of the bill in the Senate was the late Senator
Edward Kennedy, and the sponsor of the bill in the House of Representatives was
Representative Frank Pallone. S. 540; H.R. 1346.
151
S. 540; H.R. 1346.
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was approved through the PMA process and even if the state imposed
152
additional or different requirements. This proposed legislation and
the Riegel and Wyeth decisions have sparked a debate as to whether
preemption is beneficial or detrimental in the context of PMA medical devices and whether preemption should continue for PMA devices. Although the only legislation that has been proposed is in regard
to medical devices, the same arguments for and against the legislation are also relevant in the context of federal preemption of new
drug approvals.
Opponents of preemption argue that preemption denies injured
patients the opportunity to bring state tort claims that provide a
153
means of compensation and relief.
One such opponent is President Barack Obama, and although the MDSA has not been ap154
proved, the MDSA or similar legislation may have a better chance of
being approved in the future because of changes initiated by Presi155
dent Obama’s administration. On May 20, 2009, President Obama
issued a memorandum regarding preemption to the heads of the ex156
ecutive departments and agencies. In the memorandum, President
Obama stressed the importance of balance between the federal government and the states and indicated that in many instances, states
have protected the public’s health and safety “more aggressively”
157
than the federal government.
President Obama stated,
“[P]reemption of State law by executive departments and agencies
should be undertaken only with full consideration of the legitimate
prerogatives of the States and with a sufficient legal basis for preemp158
tion.”
Additionally, President Obama indicated that preemption
provisions or language should not be added to regulatory preambles
or codified regulations and that such preemption provisions that
159
have been added in the last ten years should be reevaluated.

152

See Gregory J. Wartman, Life After Riegel: A Fresh Look at Medical Device Preemption One Year After Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 291, 311 (2009)
(explaining the possible consequences that would result if the MDSA is passed).
153
See infra Part IV.A.2.
154
S. 3398, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 6381, 110th Cong. (2008).
155
See Memorandum from the White House Office of the Press Sec’y to the Heads
of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (May 20, 2009) [hereinafter Memorandum], available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Presidential-MemorandumRegarding-Preemption/.
156
Id.
157
See id. (describing the effects of preemption).
158
Id.
159
See id. (explaining what the heads of departments and agencies should avoid
with regard to preemption).
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On the other hand, many proponents of preemption argue that
it is necessary to promote innovation and the development of risky
yet beneficial medical devices because, without preemption, manufacturers will be reluctant to produce new devices knowing they could
160
be subject to state tort claims. Such proponents in favor of preemption include the FDA during President George W. Bush’s term and
161
the Bush Administration.
During his administration, President
162
Bush appointed officials who supported preemption.
These appointments were especially evident in the FDA, which changed its po163
sition on preemption during the Bush Presidency. For many years,
the FDA believed that “Congress wanted federal approval and tort
liability to operate simultaneously, ‘each providing a significant, yet
164
distinct, layer of consumer protection.’”
For example, prior to
Bush’s administration, the FDA indicated that a proposed rule
165
amending drug-label regulations “[did] not preempt State law.”
During this time, the government indicated that the FDA’s approval
was a floor and that “states could provide ‘additional protection to
166
consumers.’”
But in 2006, the FDA changed its position to favor
167
preemption.
The FDA stated that “FDA approval of labeling . . .

160

See infra Part IV.B and accompanying text.
See Requirements I, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, and 601) (describing the FDA’s position on preemption during the Bush Administration); Richard L. Cupp Jr., Preemption’s Rise (and a Bit of a
Fall) as Products Liability Reform Wyeth, Riegel, Altria, and The Restatement (Third)’s Prescription Product Design Defect Standard, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 727, 746 (2009) (describing
President Bush’s actions regarding preemption).
162
See Cupp, supra note 161, at 746 (explaining the steps Bush took during his
administration in dealing with preemption).
163
Compare Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biologics; Requirements for Prescription Drug Product Labels,
65 Fed. Reg. 81082 (Dec. 22, 2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201) [hereinafter
Requirements II] (describing the FDA’s position that their approval did not preempt
state tort claims), with Requirements I, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (describing the FDA’s position that their approval did preempt).
164
Lawrence O. Gostin, The Deregulatory Effects of Preempting Tort Litigation: FDA
Regulation of Medical Devices, 299 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2313, 2314 (2008) (quoting Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 7
(1997)).
165
Requirements II, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81103.
166
Robert Pear, In a Shift, Bush Moves to Block Medical Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 25,
2004, at N18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/25/politics/
25DRUG.html (citing the views of “the government” as of 1997).
167
Requirements I, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934–35; see supra notes 143–44.
161
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preempts conflicting or contrary State law” and that the FDA’s ap168
proval is now both a floor and a ceiling.
The transition from the Bush Administration in 2008 to the Obama Administration in 2009, the change in the FDA’s position during
Bush’s Administration, and the introduction of the MDSA or future
similar legislation could have a significant effect on preemption now
and in the future. The changes could potentially eliminate preemption completely for FDA approved medical devices and new drugs.
This is because Wyeth indicated a resistance to finding implied
preemption and Congress is attempting to eliminate express preemption. But the potential consequences of Obama’s administration and
the MDSA—no preemption—may not be the most beneficial solution. Instead, the advantages of preemption should be given more
consideration in determining what position the executive, legislative,
169
and judicial branches should take on the issue of preemption.
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF PREEMPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF MEDICAL
DEVICES AND NEW DRUGS
A. Is FDA Approval a Sufficient Substitute for the State Tort System?
If the current discord is remedied in the FDCA, preemption in
the context of PMA medical devices and new drugs would afford a
manufacturer who has received FDA approval of a PMA medical device or a new drug immunity from state tort liability. The FDA’s approval process for both medical devices and drugs would preempt the
170
conflicting state law that is the basis of the state tort claim. The fact
that a new drug or PMA device received FDA approval would prevent
an injured individual from seeking recourse through the state tort
system. These injured individuals want access to new drugs and devices, but they also want to be protected from such drugs and devices.
Based on these considerations, the issue is whether or not FDA approval and preemption is a sufficient substitute for the state tort system.

168

Requirements I, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934–35; see supra notes 143–44. But, the 2006
preamble is not the first time the FDA has expressed a preemptive view, and the FDA
has “previously preempted State law requirements relating to drugs in rulemaking
proceedings.” See Requirements I, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935. For example, the FDA has
included preemptive statements in regulations for over-the-counter drugs in 1982,
for aspirin manufacturers in 1986, and for the “disclosure of adverse event-related
[confidential] information.” Id.
169
See infra Part IV.
170
See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
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1.

Advantages of FDA Approval

Although the FDA-approval processes for new drugs and PMA
171
devices are distinct, both processes are rigorous.
When Congress
gave the FDA the authority to oversee the introduction and approval
of new drugs and medical devices, Congress’ goal was to ensure that
public health would be protected and that new drugs and medical
172
devices would be safe and effective.
As indicated in Medtronic, the
FDA is the government administrative agency given the authority to
carry out the approval process and the other provisions of the
173
FDCA. As a result, many argue that the FDA is in a better position
to determine the safety and efficacy of a new drug or PMA medical
174
device than a jury.
The FDA has been overseeing the approval of new drugs since
175
This makes
1938 and the approval of medical devices since 1976.
the FDA uniquely qualified to determine whether a particular form of
state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” and whether it
176
should be pre-empted.
The FDA is “the expert Federal [public
177
health] agency,” and as an expert, the FDA looks at the effects of a
medical product as a “whole instead of focusing on a few individuals,
178
which occurs in many jury trials.” The “FDA is in a better position”

171
See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475–77 (1996) (noting that the PMA
process “is a rigorous one.”); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 343 (2008)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he process for approving new drugs is at least as rigorous as the premarket approval process for medical devices.”).
172
See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(B) (2006); see also Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 474–75 (describing the FDA’s mission).
173
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496.
174
See Hutt Statement, supra note 16, at 11 (comparing the FDA as an expert
agency and a jury as a group of random individuals); The Safety of Medical Products Regulated by the FDA: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform,
111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Randall Luther, Ph.D., FDA) [hereinafter Luther
Statement],
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/
ucm101513.htm.
175
See supra Part II.A.
176
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
177
Timothy Ardizzone, The FDA: Advocate or Regulator of the Pharmaceutical Industry?
The Attempted Preemption by the FDA of State Tort Claims for Failure-to-Warn on Pharmaceutical Labeling, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 763, 786 (2006) (quoting Requirements I, 71 Fed.
Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, and 601)).
178
See id. (describing the FDA’s arguments in Requirements I, 71 Fed. Reg. at
3934).
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than a jury to make determinations of safety and efficacy.
Breyer declared,

179

As Justice

[W]ho would you rather have make the decision that this [product] is, on balance, going to save people or, on balance, is going
to hurt people? An expert agency, on one hand, or 12 people
pulled randomly for a jury role, who see before them only the
people whom the [product] hurt and don’t see the people who
180
need the [product] to cure them?

Juries are not capable of balancing the risks and benefits of a drug or
device the way that the FDA can because a jury is only concerned with
181
the risks and dangers of a product rather than its benefits. The jury
views only the injured, suffering patient and is persuaded by his tragedy while the FDA considers the possible risks and considers the pa182
tients who require the device or drug and would suffer without it.
2.

Advantages of the State Tort System and Concerns with
the FDA

In the absence of preemption, state tort suits can be helpful for
individuals injured by a new drug or PMA device, and many argue
that preemption is detrimental because it removes the advantages of
183
these suits. As the late Senator Edward Kennedy stated, “Congress
never intended that FDA approval would give blanket immunity to
184
manufacturers from liability for injuries caused by faulty devices.”
State tort suits allow individuals injured by a new drug or device to
seek compensation for their injuries and to impose liability on the
185
manufacturer.
These suits can reveal the dangers associated with
the drug or device because the injured plaintiff must explain how

179
See Hutt Statement, supra note 16, at 10 (comparing the FDA as an expert
agency and a jury as a group of random individuals).
180
See id. (quoting Justice Breyer); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–31,
Warner Lambert v. Kent, 552 U.S. 440 (2008) (No. 06-1948).
181
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1229 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting); Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008).
182
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1230 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
183
See id. at 1202 (majority opinion) (explaining the advantages of the state tort
system for the injured); Brief for NEJM Editors and Authors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249), 2008
WL 3851616 at *38–39 (describing the benefits of the state tort system); Kennedy, Pallone Eye Legislation to Undo Preemption Ruling, FDA WK., Feb. 29, 2008, available at 2008
WLNR 4025500 (describing Senator Kennedy’s view in opposition of preemption).
184
Kennedy, Pallone Eye Legislation to Undo Preemption Ruling, supra note 183.
185
See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202 (explaining the advantages of the state tort system).
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186

and why he was injured to initiate the state tort suit.
An injured
plaintiff’s revelation can expose previously unknown dangers related
to the use or misuse of the drug or device and can incentivize manu187
facturers to disclose such risks.
Manufacturers are motivated to
provide adequate warnings and to insure that their products are safe
and effective because they want to avoid future liability and compen188
sation to the injured party.
In sum, the state tort system holds
manufacturers responsible and protects consumers.
The state tort system also acts as a backup for plaintiffs to ensure
safety and efficacy because the FDA’s approval may not always be suf189
ficient. In a brief in support of Ms. Levine in Wyeth, editors of the
New England Journal of Medicine argued that because the FDA must
depend on the manufacturer for the information used in determining safety and efficacy in the application for approval and for information post-approval, the FDA is limited in knowing what the possible risks are; acting alone, they argued, the FDA is unable to ensure
190
completely that products are safe and effective.
Conversely, the
state tort system, through the discovery process, requires manufacturers to “disclose everything they know or reasonably should know” re191
garding the safety and efficacy of their products.
Moreover, just because the FDA has approved a PMA device or
drug does not ensure that it will remain safe because many risks do
not become apparent until after the product has entered the market
192
and been used for many years.
The FDA cannot “anticipate and
protect against all safety risks,” and no matter how rigorous the ap-

186

Id.
Id.
188
Id. at 1200; see also William P. Gunnar, Is There an Acceptable Answer to Rising
Medical Malpractice Premiums?, 13 ANN. HEALTH L. 465, 478 (2004) (“An essential element of the United States tort system is a requirement that the injured party be returned to whole, best achieved through a pecuniary award.”).
189
See Brief for NEJM Editors and Authors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 3851616 at
*3–4.
190
See id. (“[T]he FDA alone simply lacks the ability to serve as the sole guarantor
of drug safety.”).
191
Gostin, supra note 164, at 2315.
192
See Gregory D. Curfman, Stephen Morrissey & Jeffrey M. Drazen, Why Doctors
Should Worry About Preemption, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 1 (2008) (analyzing the dangerous side effects of various drugs that were uncovered after they were approved).
For example, four drugs (Aprotinin, Dexfenfluramine, Rofecoxib, and Rosiglitazone) were all approved by the FDA, but then years later, each of these drugs demonstrated life-threatening risks and some were subsequently removed from the market. Id.
187
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proval process, safety issues could still be present.
Thus, the state
tort system acts as a backup and can expose risks where the FDA is
194
unable to do so.
The FDA may also be unable to continue to meet its mission of
195
Recently,
protecting the public and ensuring safety and efficacy.
the FDA’s demands have increased, but its resources have not in196
creased in proportion to these demands. In a 2008 study, the FDA
Science Board’s Subcommittee on Science and Technology submitted a report concluding that because of inadequate funding and resources, the FDA has faced numerous “inadequacies that threaten
our society” and that the “FDA can no longer fulfill its mission with197
out substantial and sustained additional appropriations.” The Institute of Medicine also found that the FDA “lacks the resources needed
to accomplish its large and complex mission today, let alone to posi198
tion itself for an increasingly challenging future.”
3.

Why FDA Approval Is Superior to State Tort Claims

Despite the arguments in favor of state tort claims, the only real
advantage of the state tort system is the compensation it can give to
injured individuals. Although preemption does not provide compensation to those injured, its other advantages balance the lack of compensation. For example, the FDA has its own methods of exposing
199
risks and ensuring safety after the product has been approved.
193
See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 337 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting the former chief counsel to the FDA).
194
See Gostin, supra note 164, at 2314 (describing the advantages of the state tort
system).
195
See id; see also Medical Devices: Shortcomings in FDA’s Premarket Review, Postmarket
Surveillance, and Inspections of Device Manufacturing Establishment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Marcia Crosse, Director, Health Care, U.S. Gov’t. Accountability Office),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09370t.pdf (“Recently, concerns have
been expressed about FDA’s ongoing ability to fulfill its mission of ensuring the safety and efficacy of medical products, including drugs . . . and devices.”).
196
GAIL CASSELL, FDA SCI. BD.’S SUBCOMM. ON SCI. AND TECH., FDA SCIENCE AND
MISSION AT RISK: ESTIMATED RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR IMPLEMENTATION 3 (2008),
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_110/022508.ScienceBoard
Report.EstimatedResources.pdf.
197
Id.
198
INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE
HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 193 (National Academies Press 2007), available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11750&page=193.
199
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(k), (e), § 360e(e) (2006). The state tort system may also be
helpful in exposing injuries that result from the drug or medical device but only after someone has been injured. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202 (2009).
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Post-approval, new drug and PMA device manufacturers must report
any new information discovered that may affect the safety or efficiency of the drug or device, and once the FDA becomes aware of this
new information, it can withdraw its approval of the drug or device or
200
amend the label.
With respect to new drugs, the sponsor must maintain records of
clinical data and other information received relating to the drugs,
201
and the sponsor must report these findings to the FDA.
If these
records, new clinical evidence, or new information demonstrate that
a particular new drug is unsafe for use or if new information demonstrates that substantial evidence of the drug’s effectiveness no longer
202
exists, the FDA can withdraw its approval of the drug.
If the FDA
finds that an “imminent hazard to public health” is present, the FDA
203
can also suspend the drug’s approval.
Moreover, the FDA has an
Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS) that monitors for “new adverse events” of drugs as reported by healthcare professionals and
consumers to either the FDA or the manufacturer, who then reports
204
to the FDA. If the AERS shows a potential safety concern, the FDA
“may take regulatory action(s) to improve product safety and protect
205
the public health.”
Additional post-approval measures were taken in 2007 when the
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (“FDAAA”)
206
was added to the FDCA.
Specifically, § 505 of the FDCA was
amended to add provisions for “active postmarket risk identification,”
which would create a “postmarket risk identification and analysis sys-

200
201

§ 355(k), (e).
§ 355(k), (e). If records are not maintained, the FDA could withdraw approv-

al. Id.
202

§ 355(e).
Id.
204
Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillan
ce/AdverseDrugEffects/default.htm (last visited Nov. 16., 2010). Healthcare professionals include doctors, pharmacists, nurses, etc., and consumers include patients,
family members, lawyers, etc. Id.
205
Id.
206
Food and Drug Amendments Act of 2007, H.R. 3580, 110th Cong. (2007). As
the preamble explains, the FDAAA was added:
[T]o amend the [FDCA] to revise and extend the user-fee programs
for prescription drugs and for medical devices, to enhance the postmarket authorities of the Food and Drug Administration with respect
to the safety of drugs, and for other purposes.
Id.
203

MOTTES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

4/12/2011 9:31 AM

COMMENT

753

207

tem,” and for “postmarket drug safety information for patients and
providers,” which would create a website containing information
208
about drug safety, labeling, and other materials.
As part of the
FDAAA, the FDA was also granted the express authority to ensure the
safety of new drugs by imposing Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strat209
egies (“REMS”). REMS are required plans that ensure “the benefits
210
of the [new] drug outweigh the risks.”
With respect to medical devices, device sponsors cannot make
any changes to PMA approved devices that would affect safety or ef211
fectiveness without first receiving the FDA’s permission.
If the device sponsor wants to change the device, the sponsor must submit a
supplemental application that is subject to a similar review process as
212
the initial PMA. Approved devices are also subject to further postapproval protections. PMA can be withdrawn if, among other things,
the device is found to be unsafe or ineffective, if new information
demonstrates that a reasonable assurance of safety and efficacy no
longer exists, if false statements were made in the PMA application,
or if the methods for manufacturing the device were nonconform213
ing.
Moreover, one can research the safety of medical devices on
the Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience Database
(“MAUDE”), which contains voluntary, facility, distributor, and manufacturer “reports of adverse events involving medical devices,” and
provides a searchable online database that contains information
about medical devices that have “malfunctioned or caused a death or
214
serious injury.”
Despite the recent difficulties that the FDA has experienced in
achieving its mission due to financial constraints, the FDA has taken
action to correct this problem. More specifically, through its 2010
budget request, the FDA took initiatives to make sure that it could

207

21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(B)(ii) (LexisNexis 2010).
§ 355(r).
209
See Gerald F. Masoudi, Legal Developments in the Enforcement of Food and Drug
Law, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 585, 586–87 (2008) (describing how the FDAAA through
REMS expands the FDA’s authority to ensure the “benefits of the drug outweigh the
risks”).
210
Id. at 586.
211
§ 360e(d)(6)(A)(i).
212
Id.
213
§ 360e(e).
214
Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience Database—(MAUDE), U.S. FOOD
DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulation
AND
andGuidance/PostmarketRequirements/ReportingAdverseEvents/ucm127891.htm
(last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
208
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215

fulfill its mission in the future. In 2010, the FDA requested 3.2 billion dollars to better enable it to protect and promote health; this
amount was nineteen percent more than what was requested in
216
2009.
Specifically, the FDA denoted that 166.4 million dollars
would be allocated to improving the safety of medical products, in217
cluding devices and drugs.
The FDA also requested 67.5 million
dollars for drugs and 4.5 million dollars for medical devices to fund
218
the review process of each. This funding for 2010 allowed the FDA
to initiate “a distributed network of electronic health data that can
track the safety of [drugs] . . . once they reach the market and quickly
investigate potential safety signals,” and the funding allowed the FDA
to “release[] key guidance defining a path for more efficient and ef219
fective clinical trials” for medical devices.
For 2011, the FDA requested 4 billion dollars to protect and
220
The FDA is also planning on hiring 215
promote public health.
full-time staff members “for programs that protect patients and sup221
port the safety and effectiveness of medical devices” and drugs.
Additionally, the FDA is taking initiatives to protect Americans from
high-risk drugs and medical devices; for example, the FDA plans to
create a National Medical Device Registry that would “link unique
222
identifiers for medical devices with electronic health data.”
While the FDA is not perfect, neither are manufacturers or
223
The FDA has doctors and other scientific exmembers of a jury.
perts reviewing the applications for approval and is far more qualified
than lay juries to ensure that public health is protected and that

215

See Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., President’s FY 2010 Budget for
FDA Invests Substantially in Food and Medical Product Safety: $3.2 billion request
reflects a 19 percent increase from FY 2009 (May 7, 2009) available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm
152276.htm.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
The President’s Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request for FDA: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Agric., Rural Dev., Food and Drug Admin., and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations (March 9, 2010) (statement of Margaret A. Hamburg, Comm’r of Food
and
Drugs),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/
ucm204379.htm.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
See Hutt Statement, supra note 16, at 10–11 (comparing the FDA as an expert
agency and a jury as a group of random individuals).
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224

drugs and devices are safe and effective. In the context of preemp225
tion, “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone,” and
Congress “made its ‘purpose’ plain” when it gave the FDA authority
226
to regulate the approval of drugs and devices.
Nothing in the
FDCA indicates that the FDA should be second-guessed by juries, and
preemption by its very nature allows the FDA to achieve its mission
because it prevents state tort juries from questioning the FDA’s ap227
proval of a drug or device.
The FDA should not be second
guessed, and the FDA should be the only entity with the ability to impose requirements to determine and ensure the safety and efficacy of
products. If too many entities evaluate the safety and efficacy of new
drugs and medical devices and question the FDA’s determination of
approval, the public health may be endangered. No one will really
know whether a drug or device is safe and effective because the FDA
will not have the last word. Consequently, preemption is a beneficial
legal principle in the context of medical devices and drugs based on
the FDA’s expertise and rigor in the pre and post-approval processes.
This expertise and rigor makes preemption the method that posses
the least amount of danger to public health.
A further argument in favor of preemption is the fact that the
228
FDA has indicated its position in favor of preemption. Historically,
the Supreme Court has deferred to the FDA’s interpretation of its au229
thority.
In United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, the Supreme Court noted
that “remedial legislation such as the [FDCA] is to be given liberal
construction consistent with the Act’s overriding purpose to protect
230
the public health[.]”
In Bacto-Unidisk, the Court deferred to the
FDA and upheld its construction of the FDCA because it was enough
for the Court that the expert agency, the FDA, had determined that
231
the regulation in question was desirable for public health.
The
224

See id.; see also Luther Statement, supra note 174.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Malone v.
White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
226
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1219 (2009); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 474–75 (1996).
227
See Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 178 (3d Cir. 2004).
228
See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
229
See James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century: Judicial Review,
Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939, 947 (2008) (describing the types of deference given to the FDA and explaining that one type is deference “to Agency interpretations of its statutory delegation of authority over foods,
drugs, medical devices, and related products”).
230
United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969).
231
Id. at 791–92. In this pre-MDA case, the Court followed the FDA’s determination and held that the FDCA’s drug provisions covered sensitivity discs. Id. at 800.
225
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Court also emphasized that it was “hardly qualified” to second-guess
232
the FDA’s approval.
Currently, the FDA contends that its regulations should preempt conflicting state laws and that its approval
233
represents both a floor and a ceiling; therefore, deference should
be given to this position.
B. Is FDA Approval Sufficient to Promote the Public Health?
FDA approval and preemption are not only superior to state tort
claims when it comes to protecting the public health but also when it
comes to promoting the public health. The FDA has been an important mechanism in promoting public health by allowing for the de234
velopment and approval of new technology and innovations that
make medical devices and drugs “more effective, safe[], and . . . af235
The FDA’s approval process ensures that innovation is
fordable.”
236
not stifled, and preemption can also encourage innovation by
237
preempting state tort claims because the threat of liability and expensive litigation arguably deter the development of new technolo238
gy. Both the pharmaceutical industry and the FDA have supported
this argument. The pharmaceutical industry believes that the possibility of tort liability would deter the creation of new beneficial
239
drugs.
The FDA has indicated that state and common law tort
claims can lead to large damage awards that may influence manufacturers to remove FDA approved products from the market, even
though the products have been found safe and effective by the FDA,

232

Id. at 791–92.
See Requirements I, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934–35 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, and 601).
234
See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(1) (2006) (describing the FDA’s mission to promote
and protect).
235
See also What We Do, supra note 20 (describing the FDA’s mission).
236
See Contact Lens Mfrs. Ass’n. v. Food & Drug Admin. of Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 766 F.2d 592, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (describing the FDA’s approval
process).
237
Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587, 655
(2005).
238
Wartman, supra note 152, at 310–11; Device Industry Says Anti-Preemption Bill
Would Hurt Innovation, FDA WEEK, Apr. 17, 2009 (quoting Stephen Ubi, the president
and CEO of AdvaGMed).
239
Brief for PhRMA and BIO as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 2322236 at *3.
233
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or to refrain from researching and developing new drugs or devices
240
in the future.
Without preemption, manufacturers must comply with both the
FDA’s regulations and different state regulations, which may also
compel manufacturers to remove their products from the market or
241
refrain from researching and developing new products. This is especially possible if states impose additional requirements that were
242
As explained in
not originally required by the FDA for approval.
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Riegel, the inclusion of an express
preemption provision in the MDA indicates that concern over the
risks of devices and the injuries they could cause was outweighed by
“Congress’s estimation by solicitude for those who would suffer without new medical devices if juries were allowed to apply the tort law of
243
50 States to all innovations.”
Preemption is beneficial because it
aids not only those who would potentially be helped but also those
who would consequently be harmed if the device or drug is no longer
244
available or was not available in the first place.
C. Other Advantages of Preemption
As indicated by Riegel and Wyeth, preemption is also beneficial
because it protects manufacturers from liability when a doctor’s neg245
ligence is the reason for the risk.
In Riegel, although preemption
applied and the manufacturer was shielded from liability, the adverse
240

See Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 178 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Catherine
T. Struve, Greater and Lesser Powers of Tort Reform: The Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and
State-Law Claims Concerning FDA-Approved Products, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1039, 1039–40
(2008). Thus, state tort suits limit access to these beneficial drugs and devices. See
Luther Statement, supra note 174 (explaining that state tort suits might “limit[] patient and doctor choices and decrease[] patient access to beneficial products”).
241
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 351 (2001).
242
See Bruce Patsner, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.: Revisiting Preemption from Medical
Devices, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 305, 311 (2009) (quoting Ted Olson, Medtronic Inc.’s
counsel); see Wartman, supra note 152, at 310–11 (quoting Steven Ubi, “A patchwork
approach to medical device approvals where state courts effectively review and regulate medical devices would likely result in a dizzying array of conflicting labeling and
indications for use and ultimately may result in life-saving, life-enhancing technologies simply not being available for patients.”); see, e.g., Horn, 376 F.3d at 178 (discussing the FDA’s argument that “[s]tate common law tort actions threaten the statutory
framework for the regulation of medical devices”); see also Gilbert Ross, FDA Supreme,
For Now, WASH. TIMES, March 5, 2008, at A14 (“[D]anger of suits in state after state
can create a disincentive to put drugs through the centralized FDA approval in the
first place.”).
243
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326 (2008).
244
See Hutt Statement, supra note 16, at 12.
245
This argument is beyond the scope of this Comment, but it is still important
considering the facts of Riegel and Wyeth.
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reaction was the result of Mr. Riegel’s surgeon taking actions specifi246
cally warned against in the device’s label. During Mr. Riegel’s surgery, his surgeon inflated the catheter to a level beyond the maxi247
mum indicated on the label.
Additionally, the device’s label
warned against using the catheter in a patient with a diffusely diseased and heavily calcified coronary artery; because Mr. Riegel’s coronary artery was both, the catheter ruptured, and he was forced to
248
undergo emergency coronary bypass surgery.
Conversely, in Wyeth, no preemption was found and the manu249
facturer was not shielded from liability. Phenergan’s label warned
that extreme care should be used because injections were in close
250
proximity to arteries and veins.
The warning indicated that a po251
The
tential risk of the drug was both gangrene and amputation.
warning also stated that the use of an IV-drip was preferable and that
the injection should be stopped as soon as the patient complained of
252
pain. In Ms. Levine’s case, a physician’s assistant, not a doctor, administered more of the drug than the label prescribed and may have
253
injected the drug directly into an artery. Moreover, the physician’s
assistant did not stop the injection when Ms. Levine indicated that
she was in pain; in her testimony, the physician’s assistant stated that
she never thought “an antecubital injection of Phenergan could hit
an artery,” and when asked why she did not stop when Ms. Levine
complained of pain, she said that it would have been “just crazy” to be
254
concerned about an intra-arterial injection.
The physician’s assistant clearly disregarded or never read Phenergan’s label warnings.
In such professional channels, an “upstream player should never
255
be held accountable for the mistakes of downstream players.”
If
manufacturers of drugs or devices will be liable for the mistakes of
doctors without preemption, this possible liability may also deter
them from creating new products. A manufacturer, who would be liable based on claims that the FDA approved label is faulty, would not

246

Riegel, 552 U.S. at 320 (2008).
Id.
248
Id.
249
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (2009).
250
Id. at 1192 n.1.
251
Id.
252
Id. at 1192.
253
Id. at 1194.
254
Id. at 1226–27 (Alito, J., dissenting).
255
Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug Cases, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 463, 471 (2009).
247
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want to be found liable because of a physician’s negligence. In addition to preemption, initiating a medical malpractice suit against the
physician instead of a tort claim against the manufacturer may be
more appropriate in such cases. The physician, who reads the label,
determines the medical device to use or the drug to prescribe. If the
FDA has approved the drug or device, liability should then fall to the
physician for his or her negligence and not to the manufacturer for
complying with the FDA’s approval process.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
The advantages of preemption are superior to the advantages of
the state tort system in the context of medical devices and new drugs,
and the FDA-approval process sufficiently examines drugs and devic256
es.
The MDSA or future similar legislation should not be passed,
and express preemption should continue for Class III medical devices
that have received premarket approval. Currently, however, only
PMA medical devices can receive the advantages of preemption, as no
express or implied preemption applies for new drugs. To ensure that
new drugs receive the same preemption advantages as PMA medical
devices and to rectify the disparity caused by the Riegel and Wyeth decisions, the FDCA should be amended to include an express preemption provision for new drugs. This provision would amend the drugapproval section of the FDCA, § 505, and would introduce a provision
similar to the PMA medical device express preemption provision. It
would create a uniform standard of preemption for new drugs and
PMA medical devices.
A. Why an Express Preemption Provision Is Now Needed
Thirty years ago, Congress only enacted an express preemption
257
provision for PMA medical devices and not for new drugs. At that
time, an express preemption provision for new drugs was not necessary because the FDA subjected new drugs to a premarket-review
258
process for safety and efficacy; until Wyeth, there was still the possibility of implied preemption. As the Supreme Court stated in Wyeth,
if Congress thought an express preemption provision was needed for
drugs and that “state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives,” it
259
would have also created an express preemption provision for drugs.

256
257
258
259

See supra Part IV.
21 U.S.C. § 360k (2006); Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200.
See supra Part II.A.
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200.
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Unlike medical devices, no state rules “required premarket approval
of the drugs . . . so no preemption clause was needed as a check
260
against potentially conflicting state regulatory regimes.”
261
Express preemption is now needed and justified for new drugs.
The proposed MDSA and the Wyeth decision indicate that an express
preemption provision for new drugs is necessary because state tort
suits pose an obstacle to the drug development process. Congress has
already enacted express preemption provisions for almost all of the
other products covered by the FDCA, including medical devices,
262
263
cosmetics, and nonprescription drugs. Therefore, if Congress also enacted an express preemption provision for new drugs, it would
not be unreasonable as new drugs undergo one of the most rigorous
approval processes.
B. Why New Drugs and Medical Devices Should Be Treated Uniformly
as to Preemption
The FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by en264
suring the safety and efficacy of drugs and medical devices.
The
FDA reviews the applications for new drugs and medical devices to
ensure their safety and efficacy before these products can enter the
265
266
market. The review process for both is rigorous; however, the two
267
processes are distinct.
The initial difference is found in the sections of the FDCA
where the approval processes are located. New drugs are approved
based on the procedures found in § 505 of the FDCA, and PMA devices are approved based on the procedures found in § 513 and § 515
268
of the FDCA. New drugs and medical devices are subject to differ269
ent standards for determining safety and efficacy. The PMA process
260

Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 342 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See supra Part IV.
262
§ 379s.
263
Id. § 379r.
264
Id. § 393(b)(2)(B)–(C).
265
See supra Part II.B–C.
266
See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475, 477 (1996) (explaining that the
PMA process “is a rigorous one”); see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 343
(2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he process for approving new drugs is as least
as rigorous as the premarket approval process for medical devices.”).
267
Peter Barton Hutt, Richard A. Merrill & Alan M. Kirschenbaum, The Standard
of Evidence Required for Premarket Approval Under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976,
47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 605, 606–07 (1992).
268
§ 355; id. § 360c; id. §360e.
269
Hutt, supra note 267, at 607 (comparing the approval processes).
261
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requires that the medical device application provides a “reasonable
270
assurance” that the device is safe and effective, but § 505 does not
271
contain the same requirement.
For new drugs, the effectiveness
standard is “substantial evidence,” which requires that the application
provide “substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports . . . to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recom272
mended, or suggested in the proposed labeling.” PMA devices require a more flexible standard for effectiveness; the PMA process
does not include a “substantial evidence” requirement, and instead,
effectiveness “may be established ‘on the basis of well-controlled in273
vestigations, including [one or more] clinical investigations.’”
Many, including the FDA, have indicated that the review and approv274
al process for new drugs is more rigorous than PMA.
If PMA employs a lower standard that grants express preemption to manufacturers of PMA medical devices, new drug manufacturers who are
subject to a more rigorous standard should be given the same, if not
more, protections from liability. If PMA devices are subject to
preemption, new drugs should be as well. Therefore, an express
preemption provision for new drugs is both appropriate and in the
public’s best interest.
C. An Express Preemption Provision for New Drugs
In drafting the language for the express preemption provision, §
360k of the MDA is the best model. The amendment would add §
355(w) to the FDCA, and in following the model of § 360k, it could
be written as follows:
(w) General rule. No State or political subdivision of a State may
establish or continue in effect with respect to a new drug any requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this Act [21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.] to
270

§ 360c(a)(1)(A)(i).
Hutt, supra note 267, at 607 (distinguishing the approval processes).
272
§ 355(d).
273
Hutt, supra note 267, at 608 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(3)(B) (2006)).
274
See id. at 608–09 (“Congress intended medical device manufacturers seeking
[PMA] to be subject to a different, more flexible, standard of evidence of safety and
effectiveness than new drug sponsors.”); see also Gostin, supra note 164, at 2313
(2008) (explaining that the standard for new drugs is higher than the standard for
PMA); William M. Brown, Déjà Vu All Over Again: The Exodus from Contraceptive Research and How to Reverse It, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 1, 9 (2001) (“FDA’s regulation of drugs is
considered by many to be the most stringent in the world.”); Requirements I, 71
Fed.Reg. 3922, 3967 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, and
601). (“The FDA review process for an NDA is thorough and scientifically rigorous.”).
271
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the drug, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the
new drug or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the new drug under this Act [21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.].

This provision would preempt state drug requirements that are different from or in addition to any federal new drug requirement, with
275
that being the § 505-approval process.
According to the Court in
Riegel, the § 505-approval process would have to be found a requirement, and it would have to be a requirement specific to individual
276
drugs. Because the approval process for new drugs is more rigorous
and requires a stricter standard for safety and effectiveness than the
premarket-approval process for Class III medical devices, the Supreme Court may be even more likely to find it is a specific require277
ment relating to safety and effectiveness.
Assuming the § 505approval process is found to be a requirement, any state requirement
that conflicted with the FDA’s approval process for new drugs would
be preempted.
Application of the express preemption provision would only extend to new drugs for which a sponsor actually files a NDA under §
355(b). For example, drugs approved by filing an abbreviated new
drug application (“ANDA”) under § 355(j) would not fall within the
express preemption provision because ANDA applications only require the application to demonstrate that the conditions of use have
278
already been approved for another drug.
ANDA applications are
279
filed for generic drugs and must only be proved a bioequivalent.

275
Because preemption alone will not replace the compensation mechanism of
the state tort system, Congress should also consider creating a compensation program that would compensate individuals injured by new drugs. Currently, no compensation program exists for adverse reactions to drugs other than individual tort
actions, and one of the main reasons that critics argue against preemption is that
there is no opportunity for compensation for the harm suffered. See Gostin, supra
note 164, at 2315; Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202 (2009) (describing the negatives of preemption). Therefore, a compensation scheme would also be advisable to
make up for the fact that injured parties would be precluded from seeking compensation if there is express preemption. Such a scheme could be added as a subsection
to the express preemption amendment.
276
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323 (2008) (explaining that “premarket approval is specific to individual devices”).
277
See supra note 274 and accompanying text; see also Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323.
278
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i) (2006). The ANDA process seems similar to the §
510(k) approval process of substantial equivalence and would most likely not meet
the requirement of being a specific requirement as indicated in Medtronic and Riegel.
See supra notes 75–77, 113, 123 and accompanying text.
279
§ 355(j). Bioequivalence is defined as “the absence of a significant difference
in the rate and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the site of drug
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decisions of Riegel and Wyeth created a discrepancy in the way medical devices and new drugs are treated in the
context of preemption. New drugs and medical devices are both subject to FDA approval and a finding of safety and efficacy; however,
even though new drugs are subject to a more rigorous approval
process, premarket-approved medical-device manufacturers are immune from state tort claims and new-drug manufacturers are not.
The main basis for this discrepancy is the lack of an express preemption provision for new drugs.
Although this discrepancy has initiated proposed legislation to
remove preemption for PMA devices and create a uniform standard
of no preemption, the better solution would be to create a uniform
standard of preemption. The advantages of preemption outweigh
the advantages of the state tort system, and preemption can help remedy the problems of the state tort system. Preemption prevents the
FDA, Congress’s expert for drug and device approval, from being
second guessed by a jury that does not have its experience or expertise. Preemption allows the FDA to have the final word on safety and
efficacy, and it ensures that the public is protected. Preemption also
allows for the development of new, innovative drugs and medical devices and prevents manufacturers from being liable for a physician’s
negligence. Preemption is needed for the development of drugs and
medical devices and to ensure that both are safe and effective. Thus,
the MDA’s express preemption provision for PMA devices should remain intact, and the FDCA should be amended to include an express
preemption provision for new drugs so that consumers can continue
to have access to and protection from drugs and medical devices.

action when administered at the same molar dose under similar conditions in an appropriately designed study.” 21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e).

